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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALLI SMITH GIRARD,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross Appellant,

APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING

vs.
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE
APPLEBY, DON BJARNSON, and GRACE
BJARNSON,

Case No. 17662

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross Respondents.
PETITION FOR REHEARING
COME NOW the Defendants, Appellants, and Cross Respondents Charles L. Appleby, Jr., Catherine R, Appleby, Don Bjarnson
and

Grace

Michael

Bjarnson,

D.

Hughes,

his
and

wife,

by

petition

and
the

through
Court,

their

attorney,

pursuant

to

Rule

76(e) (1), for a rehearing on one point which petitioners believe
may not

have

been

addressed

or

resolved by

the Court

in

its

opinion dated March 11, 1983.
The only point upon which petitioners seek a rehearing
arises

from the first full paragraph of the second page of the

Court's opinion, which reads as follows:
On this appeal, defendants challenge the
award cf attorney fees, contending that the court erred
in reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the
time of trial.
Girard cross appeals, contending that
the court erred in refusing to consider waste and
health code violations as further evidence of breach,
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend
the complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance
of rent.
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Peti ti one rs believe,

by reason of the testimony gi_ven at tna

and Point VI addressed in their original Brief on Api:;eal, that
this paragraph should have read as follows:
On this appeal, defendants challenge the
award cf attorney fees, contending that the court erred
in reopening the case sua spcnte for the purpose of
permitting Girard to submit evidence cmi tted at the
time cf trial and in denying Defendants' attorney's
fees in sustaining the lease against the remaining
plaintiff, as testified to at trial by Defendants'
counsel.
Girard cross appeals, contending that the
court erred in refusing to consider waste and health
code violations as further evidence of breach, and that
the court erred in denying her motion to amend the
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in rulinq
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acce~tance
of rent.
Pe ti ti one rs are unsure whether the underscored inser·
tion

was

before

addressed

the

by

the

Court did not

Court.
stress

Petitioners'
this

clearly raised in Petitioners' brief.

matter,

oral

argument

al though

it was

It may be, however, that

the Court impliedly ruled on the above in its final paragraph in
the opinion which states as follows:
The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacated and set aside.
In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs.
Nonetheless,

it is unclear from the text whether the Court

d~

intend to resolve Point VI raised in Appellants' Brief regardi~
the

defendants'

attorney's

fees

summation.

by

inference

in

the

abon

,,.--,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this.U-day of March, 1983.

MICHAEL D. HUG ES
At~orney for Petitioners
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALLI SMITH GIRARD,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
FOR PETITION ON
REHEARING

vs.
CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., CATHERINE
APPLEBY' DON BJARNSON' and GRACE
BJARNSON,

Case No. 17662

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross Respondents.
BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING
Nature of Case
The nature of the case was accurately recited by Chief
Justice Hall in his opinion dated March 11, 1983, attached hereto
as an

appendix,

with

the

exception

noted

in

the

Petition

for

rehearing,

the

Rehearing, ante.
Disposition in the Trial Court
As

it

pertains

to

this

petition

for

trial court denied appellants' attorney's fees as testified to at
trial.
Relief Sought by this Petition
In
appellants'
in Point VI

appellants'

initial brief on appeal,

the

issue of

attorney's fees as testified to at trial was covered
of

appellants'

brief.

The

relief

sought by this

petition for rehearing is to seek the award of those attorney's
fees or a clarification of those reasons supporting their denial.
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Petitioners fully understand that the Court,

in

its discretion,

may deny their petition.
STATEMEN'r OF MATERIAL FACTS

Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a
a

forfeiture of

lease on certain heated mineral waters operated by defendant,

as a

recreational and therapeutic

tif f's

complaint,

defendants'
ises.

On

plaintiffs'

spa.

As

single

claim

set forth
for

if' plc.in-

forfeiture wa,

failure to maintain liabi li tv insurance on the premthe

morning

cf

trial

plaintiff

Salli

Smith

Girard

sought to try issues of health code violations not properly
and which were

not

tried

with

the

consent

of

the

ple~

defendants.

Although the trial court reserved its ruling on the propriety o'.
trying these unplead issues,

the trial court nonetheless allowed

plaintiff to introduce testimony and evidence in support of these
claims, over the continuing objection of defendants.

Most of

four-day

heal th code

trial

time was

consumed

by

these

alleged

t~

violations which were based upon information tendered to appellants

and filed with the trial

court on the morning of trial.

Although the trial court allowed testimony and evidence
ing to these heal th code violations,

after the trial

pertai~

the court

ultimately sustained appellants' objections and excluded from its
ruling all matters pertaining to causes

not

formally

raised by

the pleadings and not tried by consent.
Paragraph
attorney's
terms

fees,

of the

12

of

the

apparently

lease itself or

lease

either
in the

in
in

question
the

provided

enforcement

exercise of any

of

for
the

rights or

remedies contained in the lease or otherwise provided for by law.
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Jl.s

found

by

the

lower

court,

the

trial

of

issues

brought before it consumed most of the trial time,
such

issues
v.

l~irard

not

being

consented

No.

Ap~,

17662,

attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
defendants below,

to

by

filed

the

improperly

the trial of

defendants.

March

11,

1983,

at

3-4,

In point of fact the appellants,

contended throughout the trial that the les-

sors' acceptance of over $22,000 in rents made the maintenance of
such

an

action

for

forfeiture

superfluous

in

light

of

this

Court's earlier declarations in Woodland Theaters, Inc., v. ABC
Intermountain

Theaters,

Inc.,

560

P.2d

700

(Utah

1977)

and

Brigham Young Trust Company v. Wagener, 13 Utah 236, 44 P. 1030
(1896).

At the end of the trial in which the lease was sustained

and after
case,

appellants

appellants'

had

finished

counsel was

rebuttal

sworn

and did

of the plaintiff's
testify as

to an

attorney's fee of $2,000 in defending the lease from forfeiture.
See partial transcript at 92:18-93:2.

BASIS FOR PETITION
POINT I
IT rs UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT
ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF APPELLANTS' ATTORNEY'S FEES AS TESTIFIED TO BEFORE
THE DISTRICT COURT.
Petitioners fully understand that several points raised
in

their

appeal

were

resolved

in

terms

of

substance

Court's ruling as set forth in the attached opinion.

by

the

For exam-

ple, it is clear once the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
determination that the amendment seeking to implead new issues
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was properly disallowed, the fact that those issues might otherwise constitute harmless error was a matter this Court need net
decide.

In

its opinion,

however,

address the issue of appellants'
testified

to

at

trial.

The

this

Court did not

direct;.;

attorney's fees which had

facts

upon

which

the

be~

appellants

believe that these fees are justified were set forth in Point
of appellants'

brief,

at pp.

36-69.

That point

is

reproducec

verbatim herein as follows:
POINT VI
THE
COURT' S
DENIAL
OF
DEFENDANTS/ APPELLANTS'
ATTORNEY'S FEE IN TRYING IN LARGE PART ISSUES NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND IN SUCCESSFULLY
RESISTING FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE WAS IMPROPER,
SUCH FEES HAVING BEEN TESTIFIED TO AND BEING
ALLOWABLE PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW.
The court indicates that the rationale behind the
sua sponte motion to reopen and accept affidavits on
attorney's fees as being the confusion which resulted
from the uncertainty which existed as to the triable
issues caused by Respondent's own counsel.
During the
trial, Respondent Girard made several attempts to amend
the complaint and add additional causes of action, most
of which had occurred long after the suit was ini tiated.
Although the court noted Appellants' continuing
objections to all testimony pertaining to matter outside of the relevant insurance questions, it allowed
such testimony to enter into the record and reserved
its ruling on those issues until judgment.
As a result, the Appellants spent a large part of the trial
defending the lease and forfeiture thereof by resisting
issues not properly before the court.
Under paragraph 12 of the lease, the Defendants/.1\ppellants are entitled to attorneys fees as a
reEult of trying a case for several days defending
their position that the lease should be upheld and not
forfeited. To deny Appellants their attorney's fees by
finding them in default ignores the testimony of Doug
Labrum, called by the Respondents, whose testimony
clearly establishes, as preserved in the parti31 transcript, that .11.ppellants had cured the default within
the 30-day grace period allowed by the lease, and prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~

to the filing of suit.
(P-3, §13; PT Labrum's testimony, seriatum, R-1 showing suit filed May 8, 1978)
Yet another reason for denying Appellants' attorney's fees is equally fallacious, that is, that they
were not expended in establishing a breach of one of
their leasehold rights by Respondent.
One such right
is stated in 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord & Tenant, §330,
p.344 as follows:
[T]he rule now established by nearly all courts is
that the ordinary lease of realty, if valid, and
executed by a person capable of making such a
covenant, raises an implied covenant that the
lessee shall have the quiet and peaceable possession and enjoyment of the leased premises . . .
unless there is some express covenant of a more
limited character inconsistent with a judicial
covenant of quiet enjoyment, an express stipulation in the lease that nothing therein contained
should be construed to imply a covenant for quiet
enjoyment, or a statutory provision which is
applicable to leases, abolishing implied covenants.
None of these exceptions to the established rule
of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment apply in the
instant case.
No evidence was presented at trial to
show that that lease was invalid or that it was not
executed by a person capable of making a covenant of
quiet enjoyment, nor is there any provision in the
lease itself restricting lessees' right to quiet enjoyment, and no Utah statute applicable to leases abolishes implied covenants in leases for real property.
There is, therefore, in the lease before the court
an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment of the leasehold
premises, and in defending against Respondent Girard's
attemot to forfeit their leasehold interest, Appellants
were "clearly enforcing their rights pursuant to the
terms of the lease as implied by law. As stated by the
Utah Supreme Court in Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co.,
266 P. 1040 (Utah 1928):
The written lease does not contain an express
covenant of quiet enjoyment.
It is, however,
quite generally held that a covenant of quiet
enjoyment by the lessors is implied in every lease
for a term of years.
Id. ~t 1042.
The Hevwood case was cited for this same proposition in
Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819 (Utah 1943), and this
holding has never been reversed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As Appellants successfullv defended their riahts
of quiet enjoyment during tria~, they are entitled fo a
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in upholding their
rights under the lease, and the sum of $2 ,000 as a
reasonable sum for such attorney's fees was testified
to at the trial and was not ob]ected to by counsel for
Plaintiffs.
Clearly, this amount should be awarded to
Appellants, and assessed against the Respondent Girard.
While the foregoing argument was addressed as set forth
in appellants' brief as heretofore set forth, Chief ,Justice Hal!
in the first

full paragraph on page

2 of the Court's decisior,

dated March 11, 1983, summarized the issues raised for disposition on appeal as follows:
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in
reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the
time of trial.
Girard cross appeals, contending that
the court erred in refusing to consider waste and
health code violations as further evidence of breach,
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend
the complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance
of rent.
Petitioners

believe

that

this

paragraph

might

more

accurately have contained the following language, which is under·
scored for clarification:
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in
reopening the case sua sponte for the purpose of
permitting Girard to submit evidence omitted at the
time of trial and in denying Defendants' attorney's
fees in sustaininq the lease against the remaining
plaintiff, as testified to at trial by defendants'
counsel.
Girard cross appeals, contending that the
court erred in refusing to consider waste and heal th
code violations as further evidence of breach, and that
the court erred in denying her motion to amend the
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling
that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance
of rent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It may be that Chief Justice Hall intended to resolve
the issue of appellants'

attorney's fees in his summary of the

court's ruling on page 5 of the opinion as follows:
The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacated and set aside.
In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs.
Nonetheless,

as there was no discussion of the issue raised in

the Court's

opinion,

dealt with it.
by reason of

it

is

unclear whether this Court in fact

Petitioners believe that this Court, particularly
its

issuance of

recent seminal rulings,

has con-

tinually attempted to address and resolve all of the pertinent
factual issues presented to it on appeal which are not otherwise
resolved by inferences or rendered moot by other rulings.

Other-

wise, however, this Court's own directive requires that judicial
decision-making resolve those matters regarding which there are
claimed errors in the lower court's rulings.
Romrell v.

See, by inference,

Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 at 395

(Utah

1980) •

The

peti ti one rs

their petition.

understand

that

this

Court may

deny

The petitioners understand that this Court may

deny their attorney's fees as testified to in the lower court in
the event the Court accepts the petition.

This petition, howev-

er, is made in good faith on the basis that it does not appear
that the Court dealt with this issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The

petitioners

seek a

clarification of this Court's

ruling, adverse or otherwise, on their request in their original
brief

for

their

attorney's

fees

as

testified

to

at

trial
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and

plead for in Point VI of their original brief on appeal.
other

particulars,

the

Court's

original

opinion

is

In al_

commendable

for its thought and attention regarding the points raised by botr
counsel.

(i

0 '/

;~*-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~--- day of March, 1983.

Attorney for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
198 3, I

do

hereby

certify

that

on

the ~ clay

of March,

mailed two copies of the above and foregoing APPELLANTS'

PETITION FOR
John L. Miles,

REHEARING

AND

BRIEF

ON

PETITION

FOR

attorney for plaintiff/respondent,

REHEARING to

P. O. Box 339,

St. George, Utah 84770, postage prepaid.

SECRETARY
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EXHIBIT "A"
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-----00000-----

Salli Smith Girard,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Charles L. Appleby, Jr.,
David E. Wood, Don Bjarnson,
Catherine R. Appleby, Leone E.
Wood, Grace Bjarnson, Steven
Alfred, and Beth Alfred,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Respondents.

No. 17662

F I L E D
March 11, 1983

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Beth M.
Smith and Salli Smith Girard brought this action to declare
forfeiture of a lease on the ground that defendant lessees
had failed to furnish liability insurance coverage as required
by the terms of the lease.
Plaintiffs also sought an injunction
restraining defendants from conducting a health spa business
on the leased premises until the required insurance coverage
was obtained. Defendants stipulated that a temporary injunction
might issue, and they also furnished the required insurance
coverage. Subsequently, they stipulated that the temporary
injunction might be made permanent, and all parties except
plaintiff Girard further stipulated to the dismissal of all
issues, and that each of the parties should bear their own
attorney fees and costs. The trial court accepted the stipulation and entered its order of partial dismissal, and the
case proceeded to trial with only Girard as party plaintiff.
On the morning of trial, Girard moved to amend the
complaint to include causes of action for waste and for violations of the health and building codes. The court reserved
ruling on the motion, but permitted evidence to be presented
on those issues.
The complaint contained a demand for an award of
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the lease
agreement, but Girard rested her case without presenting any
evidence in support thereof, and without reserving the issue.
The case was duly submitted, and in its subsequent
written findings, conclusions and judgcent, the court ruled,
inter alia, as follows: 1) denied the motion to amend the
complaint, concluding that it was untimely and that the p:oposed amendment comprised new and different causes of action;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2) set aside its prior order of partial dismissal and joined
the other plaintiffs as involuntary defendants, since all pl~~
tifs, being co-owners, had not agreed on a common course of
action to waive the alleged forfeiture; 3) concluded that defeo.
dants had breached the insurance covenant of the lease, but
that the breach was not of sufficient substance as would justi'
forfeiture, and that in any event, all plaintiffs had waived ·:
the forfeiture by reason of their acceptance of rental pa~e~s
following the breach; and 4) determined that plaintiffs were
entitled to reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in enfor~
ing the insurance covenant, and ordered proof thereof by way
of affidavits. On the basis of the affidavits thereafter submitted, the court awarded Girard the sum of $3,487.50 as and
for attorney fees.
On this appeal, defendants challenge the award of
attorney fees, contending that the court erred in reopening
the case sua sponte for the purpose of permitting Girard to
submit evidence omitted at the time of trial. Girard crossappeals, contending that the court erred in refusing to consi~
waste and health code violations as further evidence of bru~.
and that the court erred in denying her motion to amend the
complaint at the time of trial, and erred in ruling that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture by the acceptance of rent.
It lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court to grant a motion to reopen for the purpose of taking
additional testimony after fhe case has been submitted but ,
prior to entry of judgment.
The court should consider such
a motion in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny
2
it in the interest of fairness and substantial justice.
Ho~
ever, no such discretion is afforded the court to reopen the
case sua sponte. Preservation of the integrity of the adversarial system of conducting trials precludes the court from
infringing upon counsel's role of advocacy.
Counsel is entitlec
to control the presentation of evidence, and should there be
a failure to present evidence on a claim a3 issue, it is
generally viewed as a waiver of the claim.
In the instant case, we are not apprised of the reum
Girard saw fit to rest her case without presenting evidence
in support of her claim for attorney fees.
However, even if
it be assumed that it was the result of oversight, the interests
of justice are not enhanced when the court exceeds its role
as arbiter by reaching out and .deciding an issue that would
otherwise be dead, it not having been litigated at the time
of trial. 4
1. _Lewis v. Porter, Utah, 556 P.2d 496 (1976).
2.
Id., citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.), Sec.
59.04[13) p. 59-37.
3. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, Utah, 648 P.2d
1382 (1982).
4. See Dixon v. Stoddard, Utah, 627 P.2d 83 (1981).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Turning now to the merits of the cross-appeal, Girard
concedes that the only claim for relief stated in the complaint
is the failure to furnish evidence of insurance coverage.
Nevertheless, she contends that the "Notice to Cure Defaults"
which was attached to the complaint as an exhibit is sufficient
to raise the issues of health and business code violations and
waste.
Girard relies upon Rule lO(c), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides, inter alia, that an exhibit to a
pleading is a part thereof for all purposes. However, the fact
that an exhibit becomes a part of the complaint does not satisfy
the requirements of Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
that a complaint "shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for relief he deems himself entitled."
While an exhibit may be considered as a part of a
pleading to clarify or explain the same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose of supplying necessary material
averments, and the content of the exhibit is not tg be taken
as part of the allegations of the pleading itself.
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits
the amendment of pleadings by leave of court, and the rule is
to be ligerally construed so as to further the interests of
justice.
However, the rule is to be applied with less
liberality when the amendments a7e proposed during or after ~
trial, rather than before trial.
In any event, the granting
of leave to amend is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of the court, and its rulings are not to be disturbed
in the absence of a showing of an abus5 of discretion resulting
in prejudice to the complaining party.
In the instant case, the motion to amend was not
made until the day of trial, and it proposed to introduce new
and different causes of action. Defendants objected to the
granting of the motion, contending they would be prejudiced
in their defense, not having been apprised of the new claims
until the morning of trial. Thereupon, the court concluded
as follows:
[T]hat the matter of the other breaches
was a significant change in the cause of
action (which consumed most of the trial
time), that it was not consented to be
5. Hoover Equipment Company v. Smith, 198 Kan. 127, 422 P.2d
914 (1967); see also 71 C.J.S. Pleading§ 375(2); 41 Am. Jur.
Pleading § 56.
6. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132 (1936).
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tried by defendant [sic], and that no
reason was adduced for not timely moving
to amend prior to trial.
Accordingly, the
court exercises its discretion under Rule
15 to deny the motion to amend.
In light of the facts and circumstances of this case
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion '
to amend the complaint. Girard's inability to state an adequate reason for the untimeliness of the motion discloses ~u
this is not a case where "justice requires" an amendment. on
the other hand, the disadvantage defendants would face if
required to meet the new causes of action reveals that the
interests of justice wi~l best be served by the court's denial
of the motion to amend.
We also find no merit in Girard' s remaining contention that the court erred in concluding that the forfeiture
had been waived by the acceptance of rent.
The ruling of the trial court follows the rule long
recognized by this Court that:
Where by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease becomes forfeited, the lessor is entitled to recover possession.
He waives that right by the acceptance of
rent. He cannot accept rent, and at the
10
same time claim a forfeiture of the lease.
Nevertheless, Girard contends that her acceptance
of rent did not constitute a waiver because the "Notice to
Cure Defaults" heretofore mentioned contained a declaration
that:
"No waiver of this notice or the required thirty (30)
days to cure the above-mentioned defaults will be granted u~m
in writing and signed by all parties concerned." However,
her contention is to no avail.
In Wo~gland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain
Theatres, Inc.,
the Court concluded f~at such a unilateral
reservation·avails the lessor nothing.

9. Id.
10. Brigham Young Trust Company v. Wagener, 13 Utah 236,
44 P. 1030 (1896), cited with approval in Woodland Theatres,
Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., Utah, 560 P.2d 700
(1977).
11 •. Supra n.10, at page 701.
12 • .!_£.,citing with approval 3A Thompson on Real Property
( 1959 Replacement), Sec. 1328, p. 576, 1976 Supplement, P· 74,
which is now to be found in the 1981 Replacement, Sec. 1328,
p. 585-86 • ./
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The trial court's award of attorney fees is vacated
and set aside.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Each party to bear their own costs.

WE CONCUR:

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Dallin H. Oaks, Justice

Richard C. Howe, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice
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